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1. Radical Philosophers 
A few years ago, a group of American philosophers, Cora 
Diamond and James Conant among them, suggested a 
resolute, or radical reading of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. 
These two authors claim that the Tractatus has a body, 
and a frame. Wittgenstein minded the frame seriously, 
whereas all the remaining propositions of the Tractatus, 
which belong to its body, are written tongue in cheek. To 
the frame of the work belong the Preface, §§3.32–3.326, 
4–4.003, 4.111–4.112 and 6.53–6.54. In it Wittgenstein 
gave meta-theoretical instructions how to treat the rest of 
the book. The main idea of the frame is expressed in § 
6.54 which reads: “My propositions serve as elucidations in 
the following way: anyone who understands me eventually 
recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them 
– as steps – to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to 
speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.).” 
This was the real message of the Tractatus. 
Further, Diamond and Conant suggest a dialectical 
reading of the Tractatus. In Conant’s words, this reading 
discerns, among other things, two doctrines in the book: 
(1) that the propositions of philosophy are misleading 
nonsense (it was embraced by the Vienna Circle positiv-
ists); (2) that there are many ineffable truths which cannot 
be articulated but which can be pointed out (it was 
embraced by Peter Hacker). The propositions of the 
Tractatus advance such illuminating nonsenses: bits of 
nonsense that are useful because they nevertheless clarify 
important parts of reality and language.  
Conant insists that, in fact, “the Tractatus ... aims to 
demonstrate how each of these conceptions is the mirror 
image of the other, each feeding on and sustaining the 
other.” (Conant 2002, 376) They are the product of two 
different impulses: “The conceptions to which these 
impulses give rise figure in the work as dialectical way 
stations that are to be successively recognized as the 
antepenultimate and penultimate rungs on the ladder that 
the reader is invited to ascend and – once having 
ascended – called upon to throw away.” (ibid., 377) 
In other words, Diamond and Conant embrace austere 
conception of nonsense which claims that the propositions 
of the Tractatus are plain nonsense and nothing beyond 
that. They have only therapeutic role, the purpose of which 
is to cure us from the inclination to embrace philosophical 
truths of conventional form; once this role is finished, they 
must be thrown away.  
2. To What Extend Did Wittgenstein Follow 
Frege in the Tractatus? 
The radical reading of the Tractatus was strongly criticised 
by Peter Hacker (in Hacker 2000). Hacker is insistent that 
the propositions of the Tractatus ascribe, above all, formal 
properties and relations, and these cannot be said but can 
only be shown. He explains 6.54 so. In this paragraph 
Wittgenstein means that his propositions are important 
nonsense. They say nothing; in this sense we can call 
them nonsense. They, however, demonstrate something 
about the language and the world; and this something is 
important – very important. 
Despite this marked difference between the two parties, 
they have something in common. Both assume that at the 
bottom of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus lies Frege’s conception 
of saying/showing. In this, they follow Peter Geach (see 
Geach 1976). My point of dissent is that, in fact, Wittgen-
stein’s Tractatus is rather a study of a completely different 
kind from both Frege’s Grundgesetzte and from Russell–
Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica. Its genre is not logic 
but logical–philosophical meditations, or philosophical 
reflections on the logical writings of Frege and Russell. 
This explains, among other things, why typical logicians, 
such like C.I. Lewis, the Polish logicians, Whitehead, 
Quine and Hao Wang, didn’t held much of Wittgenstein’s 
logical–philosophical inquiries. 
The Tractarian theory of saying/showing is also radically 
different from that of Frege. Above all, the thesis of 
saying/showing is much more central to Wittgenstein’s 
system: it determines his whole logico-philosophical 
thinking in the Tractatus. Specifically, Wittgenstein 
embraces a radical form of intuitivism which is the right 
opposite to Frege’s logic that strived to be free from 
intuition. So in “Notes Dictated to Moore” he sets out: “In 
‘aRb’, ‘R’ is not a symbol, but that ‘R’ is between one name 
and another symbolizes” (Wittgenstein 1979, 109) – i.e. 
the spatial relation between them. The corollary is a variant 
of the theory of intellectual intuition which is the heart of 
the Tractatus: “In a suitable notation [rightly organized 
geometrically] we can in fact recognize the formal 
properties of propositions by mere inspection of proposi-
tions themselves.” (6.122) This intuitivism made it possible 
to introduce a most radical form of Ockham’s Razor, which 
eliminated all superfluous entities in logic and philosophy 
such like logical constants, logical objects, epistemological 
subjects, etc. 
Of course, the programme for Conceptual Notation 
(Wittgenstein widely used this term in the Tractatus), the 
task of which was to rightly express the logical operations 
of our thinking, was first set out by Frege. In his hands, 
however, it was not thus radical as in the hands of 
Wittgenstein. In short, the latter disparaged the discursive 
thinking and embraced the intuitive one instead. His 
conclusion was that the logical symbols in the Tractatus 
are just means (an instrument) for recognizing the logical 
properties of propositions of science and everyday life: 
“Logical so-called propositions shew [the] logical properties 
of language and therefore of [the] Universe.” (Wittgenstein 
1979, 108) When we construct the graphically (geometri-
cally) right symbols, all problems of logic are eo ipso 
resolved. It is in this sense that “we cannot make mistakes 
in logic” (5.473).1  
A consequence of this position was Wittgenstein’s idea 
that there are no propositions of logic (ibid.), a position that 
can be called a ‘redundancy theory of logic’. In the same 
manner, Wittgenstein declared that in real life we never 
need mathematical propositions (6.211). So, it is no 
                                                     
1 My considerations articulated above see 5.473 as a consequence of 
6.12–6.122, not vice versa. In contrast, Conant believes that 5.473 is “the 
heart of the Tractarian conception of logic” (Conant 2002, 421). (On the roots 
of this confusion see § 4.) Where I and Conant agree is that there is one 
conception in the Tractatus that can be called its ‘heart’. 
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surprise at all that at the end he set out that there are no 
philosophical, or logico-philosophical propositions as well. 
3. Our Reading of Tractatus 6.54 
Above all, Conant suggests a mistaken interpretation of 
the Tractarian term elucidation (and the declared purpose 
of Conant 2002 is just to discuss this term, plus the term 
nonsense) which plays a central role in 6.54. My proposi-
tions, so Wittgenstein, are nonsense; but they neverthe-
less serve as something – as elucidations; they are not 
simply gibberish. “The elucidatory strategy of the Trac-
tatus, so Conant, depends on reader’s provisionally taking 
himself to be participating in the traditional philosophical 
activity of establishing theses through a procedure of 
reasoned argument.” (ibid., 422) Similarly to the process in 
a psychoanalytic therapy, the reader is elucidated if he 
actually undergoes certain experience of believing in 
philosophical perspectives of the conventional form, after 
which he understands that they were nonsense. 
In contrast, according to my interpretation, Wittgenstein 
claimed that we elucidate indefinables, or data, of any kind 
whatsoever. Indefinables are aesthetic, logical, religions, 
or practical objects. These are things that we wonder at, 
see sub specie aeternitatis, or simply beyond time. We 
cannot express or articulate them (we can articulate only 
states of affairs). What we can do with indefinables is only 
to comment them – in the same way in which we comment 
works of art, or historical events. Exactly such an indefin-
able was the Tractarian Conceptual Notation. 
Now, the propositions of the commentary have not own 
content: their purpose is simply to bring to light (to clarify) 
the indefinable under scrutiny, pointing out at new aspects 
of it. Once we have the new insight into the datum, we do 
not need these propositions anymore – they are exactly so 
needless as the ladder with the help of which we have 
reached a certain height (level) on which we now act and 
live. 
In short, my point is that Wittgenstein’s Tractarian 
propositions are elucidations of the Conceptual Notation 
and thus, of the logic of language. Being such, they train 
its reader to better see how the propositions of science 
logically relate one to another, how the logic of our 
everyday language functions, etc. In this way, they 
develop our skill to thinking better. They, however, have no 
own content.  
This interpretation of the Tractatus fits perfectly well its 
description as a ladder. To be sure, (1) exactly the 
instrument for training is what we threw away after we 
have reached a new level in our development – we have 
no interest in the instrument which brought us up to it. (2) 
What is important with such instruments is not their content 
but their form. Perhaps another person should construct a 
different type of instrument, with the help of which we will 
be trained in the same skill. In this sense, the propositions 
of the Tractatus do not express something necessary; they 
are contingent. Diamond is especially insistent on this 
point. Unfortunately, from it she made false conclusions.  
My reading of 6.54 also casts light on another difficulty in 
the Tractatus, widely discussed by Diamond and Conant. 
Wittgenstein’s insistence (in 4.1272) that objects (but also 
complexes and facts) are formal concepts evidences that 
he conceived as part of his task – to set out a right 
Conceptual Notation – not only the solution of some 
logical, but also of some ontological problems. This means 
that the Tractarian ontology is not a pure ontology; it is 
rather a logico-ontology – a part of Wittgenstein’s new 
Conceptual Notation. This point is clearly stated in the 
concluding proposition of Wittgenstein’s Conceptual 
Notation, set out in 4.5: “The general form of a proposition 
[which pertains to logic] is: This is how things stand [a 
statement in ontology].” 
It is exactly this assimilation of the problems of ontology 
to these of logic that (1) led Wittgenstein to claim that the 
ontological propositions in the Tractatus are nonsense too 
– nonsense are not only the logical so-called propositions 
which are about formal concepts. (2) It made the Trac-
tarian ontology just an instrument for better recognizing the 
logic of propositions of science and life, and nothing 
beyond this. After we have grasped this logic, we can cast 
this instrument aside. – This point rather mesmerizes 
Diamond and Conant, misleading them to (falsely) believe 
that the doctrines in the body of the Tractatus are 
suggested only tongue in cheek. 
4. The ‘Method’ of the Tractatus: How not to 
Use a Word 
The crisis in the Tractarian Studies, triggered by the recent 
dialectical reading of this work of Wittgenstein, had a 
transparent aetiology: for decades the methodological side 
of the Tractatus, which found expression in 4.1213, 5.473 
and 6.12–6.122, was not studied seriously. It is not by 
accident that exactly these paragraphs peak at the centre 
of Diamond–Conant’s argument. 
In words, Diamond and Conant investigate ‘the method 
of the Tractatus’ – this is also the title of Conant 2002. 
Unfortunately, what Diamond and Conant really do is not a 
discussion of the method of the Tractarian ideas; not 
really. Rather, they discuss its style – the strategy of the 
narrative of the book. At that, they read the remarks on the 
method of the Tractarian theories as remarks on the 
Tractarian narrative. 
Indeed, Conant’s interpretation of the ‘method’ of the 
Tractatus is that Wittgenstein wrote the book as an 
exercise in Kierkegaardian irony: it advanced theses of the 
conventional type only in order to laugh at them, saying at 
the end that they are plain nonsense. His hope was that 
the experience of going through these conventional-type 
theses will free the reader from the enchantment with such 
theses. 
Be this as it may, this reading of Conant is a thesis on 
the style of the book – on the method of articulating his 
ideas. It is not a thesis about the method of the conven-
tional-type thesese themselves. They say nothing about 
the idiosyncratic way in which Wittgenstein treated the 
problems of logic, philosophy, mathematics and ethics in 
these theses – even when he minded them tongue in 
cheek. Even worse, Conant and his friends read the 
sections which deal with the method of the Tractarian 
ideas as sections which contain hints about the architec-
tonic of the Tractatus. Here I have in mind above all 5.473 
which is quoted by practically all radical readers of the 
book: “If a sign is possible, then it is also capable of 
signifying. Whatever is possible in logic is also permitted. 
In a certain sense, we cannot make mistakes in logic.” 
Now, both Diamond (Diamond 1991, 196) and Conant 
(Conant 2002, 421) read this section as meaning: 
everything in logic is possible; so, any proposition 
expressed in the body of the Tractatus logico-philoso-
phicus is a plain nonsense. 
In truth, this section expresses the main point of the 
method of Wittgenstein’s logico-philosophical (conven-
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tional) theory: If the sign is well-constructed, it will reveal 
the logical (formal) properties of the propositions/states of 
affairs without much ado. This, however, also means that 
the very possibility of the sign is determined by the 
proposition/state of affairs itself… 
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